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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. When a motor vehicle owner such as Agency meets its 
financial responsibility through self-funded coverage, is the self-
funded liability coverage secondary and excess over the insurance 
provided (pursuant to express contractual agreement between the 
rental agency and the renter) by the vehicle operator/renter? The 
summary judgment, which presents a conclusion of law, is reviewed for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court. DeBrv v. 
Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1992) (citing Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)). 
2. When a motor vehicle owner such as Agency meets its 
financial responsibility through self-funded coverage, is the self-
funded personal injury protection coverage secondary and excess over 
the insurance provided (pursuant to express contractual agreement 
between the rental agency and the renter) by the vehicle operator/ 
renter? The summary judgment, which presents a conclusion of law, is 
reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the trial court. 
DeBrv v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1992) (citing 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)). 
3. If this court determines that Agency's self-funded 
coverage is primary, is Agency nevertheless permitted to recover the 
amount it might ultimately pay from Jorgina Chambers, pursuant to her 
1 
contract with Agency? DeBry v. Salt Lake County. 835 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1992) (citing Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)). 
4. Regardless of whether Agency's self-funded coverage is 
primary or secondary, was the trial court correct in its apparent 
ruling that Agency must provide double the statutorily required 
minimum limits? DeBry v. Salt Lake County. 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 
1992) (citing Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes, as they existed in December, 1989, 
control this case: Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-302, -304, 31A-1-301, 
31A-4-102, and 41-12a-407. The language of these statutes is 
reproduced at Addendum A to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for declaratory relief filed by plain-
tiffs to determine obligations to indemnify Jorgina Chambers, under 
Utah's financial responsibility laws. 
Course of Proceedings 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein 
the court granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claim against this 
defendant/appellant (Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.) determining obligations 
under the financial responsibility laws in the State of Utah. 
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Statement of Facts 
The following facts were either set forth pursuant to 
stipulation in Chamber's motion for summary judgment, or set forth 
without objection in Agency's response to Chamber's motion for 
summary judgment, 
1. Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Exchange is a reciprocal 
or inter-insurance exchange organized and existing under and by 
virtue of the laws of the State of California and authorized to 
engage in the insurance business in the State of Utah. (R. 21) 
2. Defendant Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. is a Delaware 
corporation, authorized to conduct the business of renting auto-
mobiles in the State of Utah. (R. 22) 
3. Defendant Royal Indemnity Company is an insurance 
company authorized under the laws of the State of Utah to conduct an 
insurance business in the State of Utah. (R. 22) 
4. On or about December 13, 1989, Jorgina Chambers rented 
a vehicle, a 1989 Dodge Aries, from Agency Rental, Inc. (R. 22) 
5. At that time, Jorgina Chambers owned a 1985 Chevrolet 
Sprint which was insured under a policy issued by Farmers Insurance 
Exchange with policy limits of $20,000 for injury to one person, 
$40,000 for injuries per occurrence and $10,000 medical limits. (R. 
22) 
6. Agency Rental, Inc. at all times relevant hereto is a 
qualified self-insurer under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
12a-406 (1986) and was certified as such by the Utah Department of 
Public Safety. (R. 22) 
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7. On December 14, 1989 a collision occurred at the 
intersection of 4505 South and 1175 West in Salt Lake County which 
involved the 1989 Dodge owned by Agency Rental, Inc. and driven by 
Jorgina Chambers, and a vehicle driven by A.C. Gomez. (R. 23) 
8. A.C. Gomez, at all times relevant hereto, was insured 
under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Royal 
Indemnity Company. (R. 23) 
9. Morgan Chambers was a passenger in the vehicle driven 
by Jorgina Chambers and owned by Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. (R. 23) 
10. Geraldine Gomez was a passenger in the vehicle driven 
by A.C. Gomez. (R. 23) 
11. As a result of the accident, Morgan Chambers sustained 
catastrophic injuries. Her medical expenses to date exceed $70,000. 
(R. 23) 
12. Agency accepted responsibility for personal injury 
protection coverage, but it does not accept that it should be 
primarily liable. (R. 40) 
13. In all of its rental agreements, Agency requires its 
renters to specifically sign the following agreement: 
Customer represents and warrants that he has a 
valid policy of automobile liability, collision 
and comprehensive insurance in force at the time 
of this rental and further represents and 
warrants that he shall maintain said policy of 
automobile insurance in force during the term of 
this rental. Lessor, relying on said warranty 
and representation, is not providing automobile 
liability, collision, comprehensive and/or 
medical expense insurance to the Customer or any 
person operating, using or otherwise occupying 
said vehicle. 
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sions, an explanatory note may be helpful as this Court considers the 
issues that are on appeal. 
First, Agency is appealing from the trial court's decision 
that Agency must provide primary coverage under the liability 
obligation set forth in Utah's Financial Responsibility laws. 
Second, Agency is asking this Court to address the question of 
whether Agency has the primary obligation to provide Personal Injury 
Protection benefits to the plaintiff. 
Even though Agency has voluntarily reimbursed Royal 
Insurance for the Personal Injury Protection benefits paid by Royal, 
Agency submits that the issue of primary versus secondary personal 
injury protection coverage is before the court, because the court did 
apparently rule that Agency was primary for all required benefits. 
Agency recognizes that the personal injury protection statute 
specifically states that: "Primary coverage is given by the policy 
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident." Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(4) . (Emphasis added.) However, Agency submits, as 
set forth below, that the only insurance policy at issue was that 
provided by plaintiff, Farmers. Indeed, as is also argued below, 
Agency could not issue insurance if it wanted to. Therefore, despite 
the language on which Farmers and the Utah State Insurance Commission 
have relied, the primary versus secondary coverage issue is the same 
for both liability coverage and personal injury protection. Agency 
submits that the issue is squarely before this court and that it 
would be a waste of judicial resources to not address both issues at 
this time. 
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coverage could not constitute "other insurance" as that phrase is 
used in the Farmers' policy. 
A. A Certificate of Self-funded Coverage is Not Insurance; Agency 
is Prohibited by Utah Law from Writing Insurance. 
In the proceedings below, the trial court adopted plain-
tiff's position that a person holding a certificate of self-funded 
coverage stands in the shoes of an insurer for all intents and 
purposes. This conclusion was premised on the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-12a-407 in effect at the relevant time, which stated that 
a holder of a certificate of self-funded coverage agrees to: 
. . . pay benefits to persons injured from the 
self-funded person's operation, maintenance, and 
use of motor vehicles as would an insurer issu-
ing a policy to the self-funded person contain-
ing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302. 
U.C.A. § 41-12a-407 (1988) 
Based on this language, the court apparently concluded that a certi-
ficate holder acts as an insurer, not only for itself, but for all 
permissive users of the holder's vehicle. Pursuant to this reason-
ing, the court held that the certificate of self-funded coverage 
becomes "other collectible insurance" within the meaning of the 
Farmers' policy and therefore becomes primary. 
This conclusion is entirely unsupportable. A certificate 
of self-funded coverage is not insurance. One need only read the 
definition of insurance contained in the State Insurance Code in 
effect at the relevant time to confirm this. Insurance is defined in 
§ 31A-1-3 01 of the insurance code as "any arrangement, contract, or 
plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons to 
one or more persons . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301. Thus, the 
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(40). Utah Code Ann. * »» J t.^ i.aiiiuu dLow, ^s^rance .^s 
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defined as any agreement between two or more persons to shift risk. 
Agency Rent-A-Car is not a qualified insurer. Therefore, it is 
forbidden by law from entering into agreements with any other parties 
to insure them by shifting the risk of financial liability from that 
party to Agency. Yet this is exactly what the court below ruled when 
it held that the agreement between Agency and Chambers constituted 
"other collectible insurance." 
It therefore becomes obvious that the court below miscon-
strued Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407 (2) when it ruled that that statute 
made a certificate of self-funded coverage the equivalent of 
insurance. Under the correct interpretation of § 41-12a-407(2), a 
certificate of self-funded coverage is analogous to a bond rather 
than to a policy of insurance. The holder of a certificate of self-
funded coverage agrees to respond and pay damages for any injury 
resulting from its "operation, maintenance, and use of its motor 
vehicle." Operation and use of its motor vehicles includes rental of 
those motor vehicles to third parties such as Ms. Chambers. Agency 
did not agree with Chambers to indemnify her for her negligence. 
However, by operation of the statute, Agency is obligated to 
indemnify third-parties for injuries caused by the rental driver to 
the same extent an insurer would be. Its liability is, however, 
derivative and arises by operation of statute rather than pursuant to 
a risk shifting agreement between Agency and its renter. It is this 
lack of agreement to shift risk that prevents the relationship from 
constituting insurance. Thus, like the issuer of a bond, the holder 
of a certificate of self-funded coverage agrees to stand jointly 
10 
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to a Humble employee. L^: ap^xicaLxe Texas statute required a self-
insurer to 
Pay on behait ot the insured named therein and 
any other person, as insured, using any such 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express 
or implied permission of such named insured, all 
sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance ox use of si ich motor 
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vehicle or motor vehicles within the United 
States of America. 
Id. at 864. (Emphasis added.) The employee was involved in an 
accident while operating a Humble automobile. Home Indemnity Co. 
brought an action against Humble claiming that Humble was primarily 
liable. The Home's claim was based on its insurance policy that 
stated that when the insured was driving any other car than his own 
personal car, Home Indemnity was liable only for such damages as 
might be assessed against the insured which were not covered by 
"other valid and collectible insurance." 
The Texas court held that the self-insurer's liability was 
secondary to that of the driver. The court reasoned that the owner 
of a motor vehicle under a certificate of self-insurance becomes 
jointly liable to the injured party along with the negligent driver 
and, by operation of the self-insurance statute, was obligated to 
compensate an injured party for negligent acts of the driver. The 
court held that had the injured party sued Humble, Humble could have 
brought an action against its employee as the actively negligent 
party and recovered judgment against him. Id. at 865. The court 
observed that this was the exact opposite result from what could have 
occurred had the certificate been the equivalent of insurance in 
which case, the driver could have brought an action against Humble to 
recover damages paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment rendered 
against him as the result of negligence. 
In Southeast Title and Insurance Company v. Collins, 226 
So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1969) the Florida Court of Appeals cited Humble 
in ruling that proof of financial responsibility is not the equiva-
12 
lent of insurance. The court stressed that shifting of risk is an 
essential incident of insurance. The court reasoned that, because 
proof of financial responsibility does not shift risk, it cannot be 
considered insurance. Id. at 248. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled the same way in Hearty 
v. Harris, 574 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1991) . The Harris court reasoned that 
the only form of automobile liability coverage that can qualify as 
insurance is a policy that has been officially certified and issued 
by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business within 
the State of Louisiana. Ld. at 1240. The court held that a 
certificate of self-insurance does not meet the certification 
requirement. Therefore, it cannot be considered insurance. As 
discussed previously, the same result is mandated under Utah's 
insurance law. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Missouri also followed Humble 
in ruling that a certificate of self-insurance is not the equivalent 
of insurance in American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Missouri P&L Co., 
517 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. 1974). The American Family court quoted the 
language from the Humble decision that distinguished insurance from 
self-insurance on the basis that insurance includes an agreement to 
indemnify the insured "against loss, even as against his own 
negligence." Id. at 114 (quoting Humble at 866) . See also Universal 
Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So.2d 730, 
732 (Ala. 1970) (Self-insurance "is actually the antithesis of 
insurance as that term is commonly used.") 
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The reasoning of Humble and the other cited cases is 
controlling on the issue of whether self-funded coverage constitutes 
"other insurance." The obligation to pay any other person all sums 
which an insurer would have to pay sets forth the limits of the 
obligation to indemnify. It does not make the certificate of self-
funded coverage "insurance". Because the obligation is to indemnify 
rather than insure, the certificate cannot constitute "other 
insurance" as that phrase is used in the Farmers' policy. Therefore, 
the Farmers' insurance policy remains the primary policy.1 
II. SELF-FUNDED PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION IS 
SECONDARY AND EXCESS OVER THE INSURANCE 
PROVIDED BY THE VEHICLE OPERATOR. 
Self-funded Personal Injury Protection (PIP) is secondary 
and excess over the insurance provided by the vehicle operator/ 
renter. In the proceedings below, Agency stipulated that it would 
pay the PIP benefits. However, it disputed that it should be held to 
be primarily liable for those benefits. Agency's position in this 
regard is premised on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(4) which states 
that with respect to Personal Injury Protection, "primary coverage is 
given by the policy insuring the motor vehicle during the accident." 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(4) (emphasis added). Self-funded 
Personal Injury Protection is not insurance for the same reason self-
funded coverage generally is not insurance. Because Agency does not 
insure, but rather, indemnifies, its coverage cannot be considered a 
1
 The Humble decision and rationale have been specifically 
approved by the Texas Supreme Court. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zellars, 
462 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1970). 
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"policy insuring the motor vehicle during the accident." For this 
reason, self-funded Personal Injury Protection cannot be primary. 
III. AGENCY'S LIABILITY LIMITS CANNOT EXCEED STATUTORY 
MINIMUMS. 
The trial court's perfunctory minute entry dated July 14, 
1992, did not address the plaintiff's discrete claims for relief. 
Plaintiff, however, submitted an order that specifically granted each 
of its claims. Agency objected to the proposed order, which 
objection was timely filed, but the court entered the order before 
the time for objection had run, in clear contravention of Rule 4-
504(2), Code of Judicial Administration. Agency's objection was 
prompted in large part by the incredible implication of the court's 
ruling, later ratified by the court's summary judgment order, 
apparently holding Agency and all self-funded motor vehicle operators 
responsible for amounts significantly in excess of the explicit 
statutory requirements. 
Although neither the parties nor this Court have the 
benefit of any explanation from the trial court, the ruling regarding 
limits appears to rely on Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407, as it existed 
at the time of the accident - 1989. The language of that statute, 
however, does not support such a finding. The statute, as it existed 
in 1989, provided as follows: 
The department may, upon the application of any 
person, issue a certificate of self-funded 
coverage when it is satisfied that the person 
has, and will continue to have, the ability to 
pay judgments in an amount equal to twice the 
single limit under subsection 31A-22-304(2) . 
Persons holding a certificate of self-funded 
coverage under this subsection shall pay bene-
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fits to persons injured from the self-funded 
person's operation, maintenance, and use of the 
motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a 
policy to the self-funded person containing the 
coverages under § 31A-22-302. [Emphasis added.] 
Section 31A-22-302, in turn, refers to § 31A-22-304 for liability 
coverage, which stated limits in 1989 of $20,000 for bodily injury 
for one person, and $40,000 because of bodily injury or the death of 
two or more persons in any one accident. The same section set a 
minimum limit of $10,000 because of injury to or destruction of 
property involved in any one accident. Nowhere in the statutes 
dealing with financial responsibility is a self-funded operator, or 
any other operator, required to provide coverages in excess of the 
minimums set forth in the foregoing sections. 
Section 41-12a-407 set forth above, clearly requires that 
a self-insurer have the ability to pay judgments in twice the minimum 
limits, but it does not require that a self-funded insurer should pay 
that amount. In fact, the second sentence of the paragraph makes it 
clear that the self-funded insurer is held to the same standards as 
insurers with respect to limits. Indeed, as Agency argued at the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, it is inconsistent for 
plaintiff to argue that self-funded coverage is the same as insur-
ance, and then to argue that a self-funded operator should be liable 
for totally different limits. (R. 140) 
The amendment to § 41-12a-407, effective 1991, illustrates 
even more clearly that it could not have been the legislature's 
intent that self-insurers be responsible for more than the usual 
statutory limits. That is, the amended statute breaks the first 
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paragraph into two subsections. The first provides that a self-
funded operator which has more than twenty-four vehicles must satisfy 
the department that it has at least $200,000 in securities, plus $100 
for each motor vehicle up to and including 1,000 and $50 for every 
motor vehicle over 1,000 motor vehicles. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-
407(1) (1991). The second subsection of the statute then reads 
exactly the same as the second sentence of the 1989 version. 
Clearly, the legislature in 1991 did not intend that a self-insurer 
owning 24 motor vehicles be subject to minimum liability requirements 
of $202,400 per accident, any more than the previous legislature 
intended that a self-funded operator be responsible for twice the 
minimum limits. 
Agency submits that there is a logical basis for a statute 
requiring proof of financial security and the ability to pay 
judgments in the amount of the minimum limits required by law. It 
makes sense to require that the financial ability exceed one claim at 
minimum limits. In fact, the 1989 statute only requiring an ability 
at twice the amount of minimum limits was arguably inadequate, 
particularly in the case of self-funded operators who maintain large 
fleets. The 1991 amendment addressed that issue. It did not change 
the limits, any more than the earlier statute imposed higher limits. 
The purpose of the cited language in both versions of the statute, 
was to ensure the availability of minimum limits, not to increase 
those limits. Accordingly, the trial court must be reversed on this 
issue and this Court should make it clear that regardless of how an 
operator chooses to meet its financial responsibility commitments 
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under the applicable statutes, the limits are uniform with respect to 
all operators. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Agency respectfully 
submits that this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Farmers and remand the matter to the 
trial court with instructions to deny Farmers' motion for summary 
judgment. In addition, this Court should rule as a matter of law 
that self-funded motor vehicle operators are required to provide 
coverage that is secondary or excess to that provided by insurers, 
and that in no event is a self-funded operator required to pay more 
than the minimum limits provided by statute at the applicable time. 
If*** 
DATED this <ZLL_1 day of March, 1993. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Robert K. Hildef* 
Wesley M. Lang 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
INSURERS IN GENERAL 31A-4-104 
History: C. 1953,31A-4-101, enacted by L. Meaning of "this code." — See note under 
1985, ch, 242, § 9. same catchline following § 31A-1-104. 
31A-4-102. Qualified insurers. 
No person may do an insurance business in Utah, either in person, through 
agents or brokers, or through the mail or any other method of communication, 
except: 
(1) an insurer authorized to do business in Utah under Chapter 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 13, or 14, within the limits of its certificate of authority; 
(2) a joint underwriting group under Section 31A-2-214 or 31A-20-102; 
(3) an insurer doing business under Section 31A-15-103; 
(4) a person who, pursuant to Section 31A-1-105, submits to the com-
missioner a certificate from the United States Department of Labor, or 
such other evidence as satisfies the commissioner, that the laws of Utah 
are preempted with respect to specified activities of that person by Sec-
tion 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or other 
federal law; or 
(5) A person exempt from the application of the Insurance Code under 
Section 31A-1-103 and all other applicable statutes. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-4-102, enacted by L. Federal Law. — Section 514 of the Em-
1985, ch. 242, § 9; 1987, ch. 91, § 9. ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- 1974, referred in Subsection (4), appears as 29 
ment, in Subsection (2), substituted "31A-2- U.S.C. § 1144. 
214 or 31A-20-102" for "31A-4-202." Insurance Code. — See § 31A-M01. 
31A-4-103. Certificate of authority. 
Each certificate of authority issued by the commissioner shall specify the 
name of the insurer, the kinds of insurance it is authorized to transact in 
Utah, and any other information the commissioner requires. 
History: C. 1953,31A-4-103, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Exemption from fees 
1985, ch. 242, § 9. of lieutenant governor, § 21-1-2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 69. ance of policy beyond authority or contrary to 
A.L.R. — Liability of insurance agent, for instructions, 35 A.L.R.3d 907. 
exposure of insurer to liability, because of issu- Key Numbers. — Insurance *=» 5. 
31A-4-104. Bar on local activity by persons not authorized 
to do an insurance business. 
A person not qualified under Section 31A-4-102 to do an insurance business 
may not, from offices or by personnel or facilities located in Utah, solicit 
insurance applications or transact insurance business in another jurisdiction. 
History: C. 1953,31A-4-104, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 242, § 9. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 31A-1-301 
(37.5) "Individual" means a natural person. 
(38) "Inland marine insurance" includes insurance covering: 
(a) property in transit on or over land; 
(b) property in transit over water by means other than boat or 
ship; 
(c) bailee liability; 
(d) fixed transportation property such as bridges, electric trans-
mission systems, radio and television transmission towers and tun-
nels; and 
(e) personal and commercial property floaters. 
(39) "Insolvency" means that an insurer is unable to pay its debts or 
meet its obligations as they mature or that an insurer's qualified assets 
under Section 31A-17-201 do not exceed its liabilities plus: 
(a) (i) minimum required capital; or 
(ii) for mutuals, permanent surplus; plus 
(b) 30% of the compulsory surplus required to be maintained under 
Section 31A-17-302 or 31A-8-210. 
For purposes of this definition, "liabilities" includes reserves required 
by law, and "qualified assets" includes lk of the maximum total assess-
ment liability of the policyholders of the insurer. 
(40) "Insurance" means any arrangement, contract, or plan for the 
transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons to one or more other 
persons, or any arrangement, contract, or plan for the distribution of a 
risk or risks among a group of persons that includes the person seeking to 
distribute his risk. "Insurance" includes: 
(a) risk distributing arrangements providing for compensation or 
replacement for damages or loss through the provision of services or 
benefits in kind; 
(b) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered into by the guaran-
tor or surety as a business and not as merely incidental to a business 
transaction; and 
(c) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the person who 
makes the arrangements, but with a class of persons who have 
agreed to share it. 
(41) "Insurance adjuster" means a person who directs the investiga-
tion, negotiation, or settlement of a claim under an insurance policy other 
than life insurance or an annuity, on behalf of an insurer, policyholder, or 
a claimant under an insurance policy. Refer also to Subsection 
31A-26-102U). 
(41.5) "Interinsurance exchange" is defined in Subsection (69). 
(42) "Insurance agent" or "agent" means a person who represents in-
surers in soliciting, negotiating, or placing insurance. Refer to Subsection 
31A-23-102(3) for exceptions to this definition. 
(43) "Insurance broker" or "broker" means a person who acts in procur-
ing insurance on behalf of an applicant for insurance or an insured, and 
does not act on behalf of the insurer except by collecting premiums or 
performing other ministerial acts. Refer also to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) 
for exceptions to this definition. 
(44) "Insurance business" or "business of insurance" includes: 
(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (35), 
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41-12a-407 MOTOR VEHICLES 
panied by evidence that there are no unsatisfied liens of any character on the 
assets deposited. 
(2) The deposit shall be held by the state treasurer in trust to satisfy any 
execution on a judgment that would be paid under an insurance policy con-
forming to Section 31A-22-302 had the treasurer issued such a policy. 
(3) Except as provided under Subsection (2), assets deposited with the trea-
surer under this chapter are exempt from attachment or execution. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-406, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48. 
41-12a-407. Certificate of self-funded coverage as proof of 
owner's or operator's security. 
(1) The department may upon the application of any person, issue a certifi-
cate of self-funded coverage when it is satisfied that the person has and will 
continue to have the ability to pay judgments in an amount equal to twice the 
single limit amount under Subsection 3lA-22-304(2). Persons holding a certif-
icate of self-funded coverage under this subsection shall pay benefits to per-
sons injured from the self-funded person's operation, maintenance, and use of 
motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person 
containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302. 
(2) Upon not less than five days' notice and a hearing pursuant to the 
notice, the department may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel the certificate. 
Failure to pay any judgment up to the limit under Subsection 31A-22-304(2) 
within 30 days after the judgment is final is a reasonable ground to cancel the 
certificate. 
History: C. 1953, 4M2a-407, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of self-insurance. 
Liability of county 
Self-insurer. 
Effect of self-insurance. 
Former provision that a self-insurer had to 
provide "security equivalent to that offered by 
a policy of insurance" did not engraft onto the 
statute a\\ benefits 'which may be described as 
"standard" insurance policy provisions Foster 
v. Salt Lake County, 712 P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own ve-
hicles operated by permissive users, under for-
mer law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 7 1 0 
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
Self-insurer. 
Since a certificate of self-insurance is simply 
an assurance that judgments will be paid and 
is not really insurance or a policy of insurance, 
this section, by its own terms, does not require 
a self-insurer to provide uninsured motorist 
coverage to its passengers American States 
Ins Co v Utah Transit Auth., 699 P.2d 1210 
(Utah 1985) (decided under similar provisions 
of former § 41-12-21.1). 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-302 
31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insur-
ance policies — Exceptions. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall 
include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 
31A-22-304; and 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless af-
firmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except 
for motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury 
protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-22-309. 
(3) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies 
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. These 
owners and operators are not covered by personal injury protection coverages 
in connection with injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-302, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, in Subsection (2), inserted "trailers, and 
semitrailers", designated the second and third 
sentences in former Subsection (2) as Subsec-
ANALYSIS 
Liability of county. 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
—Exclusionary clause 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own ve-
hicles operated by permissive users, under for-
mer law See Foster v Salt Lake County, 712 
P 2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
—Exclusionary clause. 
Former § 41-12-21 1, which merely required 
insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am Jur 2d Automobile 
Insurance § 4. 
C.J.S. — 60 C J S . Motor Vehicles § 110. 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of "no-
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L R 3d 
229 
Injury or death caused by assault as within 
coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 
44 A L R 4th 1010 
tion (3), and, in Subsection (3), in the first sen-
tence inserted "trailer, and semitrailer" and m 
the second sentence substituted "These" for 
"Motorcycle" and "any of these vehicles" for "a 
motorcycle " 
and authorized motorists to waive coverage, 
did not require them to allow an individual to 
purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain 
coverage on all the other vehicles in his house-
hold, a clause excluding such multiple cover-
age is permissible Clark v State Farm Mut. 
Auto Ins Co, 743 P 2d 1227 (Utah 1987) 
A policy that covered the insured for any in-
jury caused by an uninsured motorist, exclud-
ing therefrom only uninsured "automobiles" 
owned by the insured, did not exclude unin-
sured motorist coverage when the insured was 
operating a motorcycle Bear River Mut Ins. 
Co v Wright, 770 P 2d 1019 (Utah Ct App 
1989). 
Validity, under insurance statutes, of cover-
age exclusion for injury to or death of insured's 
family or household members, 52 A L R 4th 18. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting 
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance pol-
icy, or statute mandating insurance coverage, 
59 A L R 4th 149 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 144 1(4). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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31A-22-304 INSURANCE CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability insurance: when is vehi-
cle in "dead storage," 48 A.L.R.4th 591. 
Automobile liability insurance policy flight 
from police exclusion: validity and effect, 49 
A.L.R4th 325. 
What constitutes use of vehicle Nin the auto-
mobile business" within exclusionary clause of 
liability policy, 56 A.L.R.4th 300. 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policy providing similar coverage, 61 
A.LiUth 1130. 
What constitutes "motor vehicle" for pur-
poses of no-fault insurance, 73 A.L.R.4th 1053. 
31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits. 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the in-
surer's liability under that coverage below either of the following: 
(1) twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one 
person, in any one accident, and, subject to this limit for one person, in 
the amount of $40,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more 
persons in any one accident, and in the amount of $10,000 because of 
injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident; or 
(2) forty thousand dollars in any one accident whether arising from 
bodily injury to or death of others, or from destruction of or damage to the 
property of others. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-304, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Liability of county. 
Liability of self-insurers. 
Cited. 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own ve-
hicles operated by permissive users, under for-
mer law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
Liability of self-insurers. 
Public policy as expressed in Utah law is 
that self-insurers must provide security for 
damages inflicted by themselves, and by per-
missive users of their vehicles. There is no ex-
pressed public policy that would require find-
ing liability based upon mere ownership of a 
vehicle. Lane v. Honeywell, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 
370 (D. Utah 1987) (decided under former Title 
31). 
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, par-
ent or child of accident victim as within ex-
tended "per accident" rather than "per person" 
coverage of automobile liability policy, 46 
A.L.R.4th 735. 
What constitutes single accident or occur-
rence within liability policy limiting insurer's 
liability to a specified amount per accident or 
occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668. 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAMBERS, JORGlNA 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
AGENCY RENT-A-CAR, INC 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910901699 CV 
DATE 07/14/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING BEEN HEARD 
BY THIS COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN 
TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW 
BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES ORDERS MOTION GRANTED. 
CC: ANDREA C. ALCABES 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
MR. GLEN CLEEK 
JUL 1 7 1992 
ADDENDUM C 
JUL 2 7 1992 
Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq., USB No. 32 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
136 South Main Street, Suite 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
Oy.S^ jfeS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JORGINA CHAMBERS and 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
AGENCY RENT-A-CAR, INC., and 
ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
©inters 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Civil No. C-91-1699 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing 
on July 6, 1992, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. 
Memoranda had been filed by counsel for plaintiffs and counsel 
for Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. The plaintiffs were represented at 
the hearing by counsel, Andrea C. Alcabes. Defendant Agency 
Rent-A-Car, Inc. was represented by counsel, Robert K. Hilder. 
Defendant Royal Indemnity Company did not appear. The court 
heard arguments on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
took the matter of the court's decision under advisement. 
The court having considered and now being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby orders that plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and it is hereby: 
ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. owes primary coverage for 
liability and for personal injury protection benefits for the 
accident of December 14, 1989, involving a vehicle owned by 
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. and driven by Jorgina Chambers and 
vehicle driven by A.C. Gomez. Insurance coverage by Farmers 
Insurance Exchange is secondary. 
2. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. owes liability coverage in the 
amount of $80,000.00 for the accident of December 14, 1989, 
involving a vehicle owned by Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. and driven 
by Jorgina Chambers and a vehicle owned by A.C. Gomez. 
3. The issue of liability for reimbursement for personal 
injury protection coverage is to decided by mandory, binding 
arbitration between defendant Royal Indemnity Company and Agency 
Rent-A-Car, Inc. 
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